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IS IT TIME FOR LAWYER PROFILES?
Steven K. Berenson
INTRODUCTION
Following the recommendations of trusted resources,' at around the
eighth month of my wife's pregnancy with our first child.2 my wife and
I began to search for a pediatrician. Being relatively new to south
Florida, we did not know the names of any pediatricians off hand.
Thus, as many would, we turned to "word of mouth." Fortunately, we
were quite enamored with my wife's obstetrician/gynecologist
("OB/GYN") and were pleased when he recommended two
pediatricians for us to consider. The first ("Physician A") had just
moved his practice from California to Florida, and shared an office
building with and was a member of the same hospital district as our
OB/GYN. The second ("Physician B") was the pediatrician that our
OB/GYN took his own children to. Additionally, my wife was able to
obtain a third recommendation ("Physician C") for a pediatrician that
two persons from my wife's workplace took their children to and were
pleased with.
Again following the guidance of trusted resources,' and armed with
a long list of suggested questions to ask, my wife and I scheduled
interviews with each of the three recommended physicians. I also
confirmed that each of the physicians was a member of the Health
Maintenance Organization ("HMO") that we subscribe to, so that the
insurer would pay for care provided by these pediatricians. In
addition, prior to attending the interviews, I looked up each doctor's
Florida Practitioner Profile on the Internet.' Pursuant to a state
statute,5 beginning July 1, 1999, the Florida Department of Health was
"Assistant Professor of Law. Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern
University. B.A., Franklin and Marshall College: J.D.. Harvard Law School: L.L.M.,
Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Deanna Sampson for reading
and commenting on an earlier draft. The author would also like to thank Marion
Berenson for helping to provide the topic for this article. All those years of clipping
and mailing newspaper articles finally paid off.
1. See, e.g., Katherine Karlsrud, Choosing Healthcare For Your Baby, Lamaze
Parents Magazine. FalllWinter 1999, at 94.
2. Michaela Remy Sampson Berenson. b. Jan. 12, 2001.
3. See Karlsrud, supra note 1. at 96.
4. Florida Department of Health, Florida Practitioner Profile Web site,
http://www.doh.state.fl.uslmqalProfilinglindex.html (last visited Oct. 15. 2001).
5. Fla. Stat. ch. 456.041 (2001).
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required to compile a "practitioner profile" for all physicians seeking
an initial license to practice medicine in the state or renewal of an
existing license.6 Among the information that must be included in
such practitioner profiles are: 1) the names of and dates of attendance
at each medical school the practitioner attended; 2) the name of each
location at which the practitioner has privileges; 3) the address from
which the practitioner will primarily conduct his or her practice; 4)
any specialty board certifications; 5) the year that the physician began
practicing medicine; 6) any medical school faculty appointments; 7)
any convictions or pleas of nolo contendre for any criminal offense;
and 8) any disciplinary action taken against the practitioner within the
past ten years by any medical licensing board, specialty board, or
medical practice organization (including resignation or non-renewal of
staff membership or privileges at any hospital, HMO, clinic, or similar
organization).7 Additionally, the profile must contain information
regarding the physician's compliance with state law requirements for
demonstrating financial responsibility, such as obtaining a minimally
required amount of professional liability insurance.' The profile also
must contain information regarding any professional liability action
within the past ten years which involved a payment of more than
$5000.1 Finally, practitioners may choose to include in their profiles
information regarding committee memberships, professional or
community service awards, publications, and languages spoken other
than English.'"
Prior to meeting with any of the three physicians, and prior to
checking their physician profiles, it seemed that Physician B was the
leading candidate to become our daughter's pediatrician. What could
be a stronger positive factor than the fact that our own respected
OB/GYN takes his kids to that doctor? However, checking Physician
B's profile revealed some troubling information. First, Physician B's
profile revealed two malpractice settlements, in 1993 and 1996 for
$250,000 and $225,000 respectively. Second, Physician B received a
suspension from the Florida Department of Health in 1994, though
the penalty was stayed in that instance. By contrast, the profiles of the
other two physicians under consideration revealed no disciplinary
action or malpractice payments. In other respects, for example
6. Id.; see also id. ch. 456.039.
7. Id. ch. 456.039(1)(a)1-8.
8. See id. chs. 456.041(4), 458.320.
9. Id. ch. 456.041(4). The statute dictates that any information regarding
professional liability actions be accompanied by the following language: "Settlef ent
of a claim may occur for a variety of reasons that do not necessarily reflect negatively
on the professional competence or conduct of the practitioner. A payment in
settlement of a medical malpractice action or claim should not be construed as
creating a presumption that medical malpractice has occurred." Id.
10. See id. ch. 456.039(5).
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medical education, practice experience, and board certifications, the
three physicians appeared comparable."
This article will reflect closely on the positive or negative role that
physician profiles might play in the physician selection process, and,
more importantly for present purposes, try to determine whether
similar "lawyer profiles" would be a positive or negative step in
helping middle-income persons to find appropriate legal
representation.
Following this introduction, this article will examine the difficulties
middle-income persons encounter in trying to find appropriate legal
representation, and will relate those difficulties to similar difficulties
encountered by persons seeking medical treatment. 2 Next, the article
will discuss the recent wave of state physician profile legislation,"
including both the underlying conditions that led to the adoption of
such legislation 4 and the arguments that have been advanced both in
favor of and in opposition to physician profile legislation.'5 Then, the
article will apply the discussion of physician profile legislation to the
legal practice context 6 in order to consider whether similar "lawyer
profiles" are likely to appear in the near future 7 and whether,
regardless of their imminence, such profiles would be valuable to
middle-income persons who are seeking legal representation." The
article postulates that, while the underlying conditions that led to the
adoption of physician profile legislation are not sufficiently present in
the legal practice context to make the development of publicly
accessible lawyer profiles likely in the near future."9 such profiles
would, in fact, be of value to prospective consumers of legal services.2"
Therefore, the article continues to consider what information should
be included,2' and what information excluded,2' from lawyer profiles.
11. To find out how the rest of our pediatrician selection process went, how the
above-described information factored into our final decision, and what that decision
was, see infra Conclusion.
12. See hnfra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. See infra Part III.C.1.
22. See infra Part III.C.2.
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I. WHY IT'S EVEN HARDER FOR THE AVERAGE PERSON TO FIND A
LAWYER THAN IT IS TO FIND A DOCTOR
The problem of how middle-income persons go about finding an
appropriate lawyer for their legal needs has been much discussed."
The consensus seems to be that there is no clear or easy way for a
person to find an appropriate lawyer for his or her particular legal
needs.2 ' According to a recent survey conducted on behalf of
Martindale-Hubbell, z5 "[m]ore than one-fourth of Americans admit
that the inability to compare information about different attorneys
(28%) and being intimidated or confused by the whole process (27%)
of choosing a lawyer would limit their ability to research their
options. ' 26 Another fifth (20%) claim their ability to research options
for choosing a lawyer is limited by lack of resources and information. 7
The Martindale-Hubbell survey concluded that the most common
source people turn to in their quest to find appropriate legal
representation is the views of family members and friends.28 A full
three-quarters of those surveyed (75%) indicated that they would rely
on family and friends to be their first resource when trying to find a
lawyer.29 However, reliance on word of mouth may be particularly
problematic in conjunction with the selection of professional services.
The predominant view of the delivery of professional services in
America over the past century has been that of the "Professionalism
Paradigm."3  One of the fundamental conditions underlying the
23. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans,
44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531, 541 (1994); Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer:
Why Consumers Can't Always Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession
Should Do About It, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283,284 nn.1-2 (1992) (citing sources).
24. Morton, supra note 23, at 284 & nn.1-2; see also Here's How We Find Lawyers,
The Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 7,2001, at B7.
25. Martindale-Hubbell publishes the longest standing, best known, and most
widely used directory of lawyers published in the United States. The company
currently offers its directory over the Internet, http://www.lawyers.com, and in
traditional print format, The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (2001).
26. Yankelovich, Lawyers in America: How We Choose Them, Use Them, and
Sometimes Lose Them 26 (December 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Lawyers in America]. The survey, based on interviews with 1001
adults chosen through random-digit dialing, was conducted by Yankelovich on behalf
of Kaplow Communications and Lawyers.com, the Internet division of Martindale-
Hubbell. See Lawyers in America, supra, at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 24.
30. The term "Professionalism Paradigm" is taken from an important and
influential article by Russell Pearce. See Russell Pearce, The Professionalism
Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and
Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1230 (1995). Pearce, in turn, borrowed
the concept of a "paradigm" from a groundbreaking book by Thomas S. Kuhn. See
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3d ed. 1996). 1 have
discussed Pearce's article in greater detail elsewhere. See Steve Berenson, Politics and
[Vol. 70
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"bargain"3 that is the essence of the Professionalism Paradigm is the
fact that the delivery of professional services involves the application
of "esoteric knowledge, 32 of the kind which requires years of
specialized education and training to acquire.33  The recipients of
professional services lack the specialized knowledge necessary to
evaluate the quality of services they receive. -' Therefore, client or
patient recommendations based upon personal experiences with
particular professionals may be misleading.
The problems with word-of-mouth recommendations may be even
more acute in the legal context than in the medical context.35 This is
because most Americans are in regular contact with at least one
physician.36 Indeed, the increasing number of people who receive
their medical care through some sort of managed care planl are
Plurality in a Lawyer's Choice of Clients: The Case of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 San
Diego L. Rev. 1, 35-46 (1998).
31. Pearce, supra note 30, at 1238. Pearce describes the Professionalism Paradigm
in terms of a bargain between the profession and society: The profession agrees to use
its specialized knowledge and skills for the benefit of its clients (or patients) and the
public at large, and society, in turn, agrees to grant to the profession an exclusive right
to practice the profession, free from government, and to some extent, market control.
Id.
32. Id. at 1239. The other two fundamental conditions that Pearce identifies as
underlying the Professionalism Paradigm are altruism, the notion that the profession
will place its clients' and the public's interest ahead of its own financial and other self-
interests, and autonomy in the form of self-regulation by the profession. Id. at 1239-
40.
33. For example, doctors must complete at least four years of medical school
training and a year-long internship, and pass three parts of the national licensing
examination, before they are considered minimally qualified to practice medicine in
any of the 50 states. See In Re Boston Medical Center Corporation, No. 1-RC-20574,
1999 WL 1076118, at *1-3, *16, *33 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 26, 1999) (discussing medical
education in the context of holding that medical interns, residents, and fellows are
"employees" for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act). Similarly, lawyers
must graduate from an accredited law school and pass a state bar examination to be
eligible to practice law. See, eg., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of
Lawyering 870 (3d ed. 1999).
34. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice: Releasing Physician-
Specific Data to the Public, 8 Loy. Consumer L. Rep. 125, 126 (1996); Douglas
Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific Quality-of-Care Data: A Proposal for Limited
Mandatory Disclosure, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 85, 92-93 (1992).
35. See Morton, supra note 23, at 284-85, 284 n.3 (describing reliance on word of
mouth to find an attorney as "anachronistic").
36. According to the Martindale-Hubbell survey, 77% of Americans indicated
that they had hired a primary care physician. See Lawyers in America, supra note 26,
at 16.
37. A simple definition describes managed care as "any system of health coverage
in which the entity responsible for paying for covered services exercises control over
the manner in which those services are delivered." William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 Colum. L. Rev.
1701,1704 n.5 (1999) [hereinafter Sage, Regulating Through Information]. As of early
1998, 165 million Americans received some form of managed medical care.. See
Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A Proposal
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usually required by the plan to have a primary care physician, who
serves essentially as a gatekeeper for all of the medical services
received under the plan. 8 Thus, at least the primary care physician
can offer an "expert" opinion with regard to referrals for doctors to
perform specialty care.39 Indeed, it is just such a referral that my wife
and I sought in our search for a pediatrician.40
By contrast, most persons are not in regular contact with an
attorney who plays a role analogous to that of the primary care
physician.4 Suggestions have been made that persons engage in
periodic "legal checkups" along the lines of annual physical exams. 2
While preventive lawyering of this type might make sense for business
or other entity clients, it seems implausible in the current context
where most of the existing legal needs of middle-income individuals
for Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 95, 100 (1998).
38. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury:
Rethinking Liability, 31 Ga. L. Rev. 419,444,482-84 (1997); Sage, Regulating Through
Information, supra note 37, at 1746 n.154.
39. Of course, this arrangement does not resolve the difficulty a person might
have in selecting a primary care physician. But see infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the trend of intermediary institutions such as managed
care plans to provide information to consumers to help them select a primary care
physician). Moreover, as Sage points out, a primary care physician's competence in
making referrals may differ from that physician's competence as a practitioner. Sage,
Regulating Through Information, supra note 37, at 1746 n.154. Additionally, the
primary care physician may have certain financial or other conflicting interests that
may cause referrals to be made for reasons other than the merit of the referred-to
doctor. Cf. Hall, supra note 37, at 104 (describing "withholds"-accounts set aside by
managed care organizations to pay for specialty care, where part or all of any surplus
in the account is paid to the primary care physician who provided fewer referrals than
the allotted amount was set aside to cover).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
41. However, the Martindale Hubbell survey indicated that 68% of those
surveyed had hired a lawyer at some point in their lives. See Lawyers in America,
supra note 26, at 22. Moreover, of those surveyed who had previously hired a lawyer,
52% claimed to have a "family lawyer" who handled all their affairs. Id. at 41.
Nonetheless, this means that only a little more than a third of those surveyed claimed
to have such a family lawyer.
42. See, e.g., Gary Bellow & Jean Charn, Paths Not Yet Taken: Some Comments
On Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 Geo. L.J. 1633, 1659 app. II
(1995) (suggesting "legal check ups" for legal services recipients); Louis M. Brown,
The Practice of Preventive Law, 35 Am. Judicature Soc'y 45 (1951) (advocating
"preventive law" along the lines of "preventive medicine"); Forrest S. Mosten,
Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 Fam. L.Q. 421,445-46 (1994)
(advocating asymptomatic "legal wellness" checkups). Apparently, members of the
American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") Legal Services Network have
begun providing "Legal Checkup seminars" at various locations throughout the
country. See AARP Legal Services Network, at http://www.aarp.org/lsn/checkup.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001); see also Wayne Moore & Monica Kolasa, AARP's Legal
Services Network. Expanding Legal Services to the Middle Class, 32 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 503, 533 (1997). However, such group presentations seem a far cry from the
individual examinations one would expect to receive from a physician.
[Vol. 70
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go unmet.43 For a number of years, a variety of prepaid legal services
plans that may function in similar ways to health insurance, thereby
providing access to lawyers for common legal needs for clients, have
also been in existence.4 However, under such plans members do not
receive a "primary care lawyer" who functions similarly to a primary
care physician in a managed health care plan. Rather, prepaid legal
services plan members are referred by the plan to particular lawyers
affiliated with the plan to handle discreet legal problems.5 Generally,
in a given calendar year, the plan will pay for a certain number of
hours of legal services provided by its affiliated lawyers' for the types
of services covered under the plan.47 Members do not receive routine
legal checkups or anything resembling the type of preventive care that
is the cornerstone of managed health care plans45 Moreover, even
though there has been an increase in activity regarding prepaid legal
services plans in the past few years, the percentage of persons being
served by such plans is not yet significant enough to have much of an
overall impact in improving the way people choose attorneys. 9
Presently, the number and variety of arrangements for delivering
managed health care are staggering.50 While some managed care
plans employ physicians directly,"' an increasing number of plans
43. According to a survey conducted by the American Bar Association ("ABA"),
61% of the situations faced by moderate income households that could be addressed
by the civil justice system are not brought to any part of the justice system. See ABA
Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A
Survey of Americans-Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study
24 (1994).
44. See Brian Heid & Eitan Misulovin, The Group Legal Plan Revolution: Bright
Horizon or Dark Future?, 18 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. LJ. 335 (2000); see also Harland
C. Stonecipher & James W. Robinson, The Pre-Paid Legal Story (2000).
45. Heid & Misulovin, supra note 44, at 342.
46. See, e.g., Jim Ellshoff, Pre-Paid Legal Coverage Now Offered in Montana, 25
Mont. Law. 31, 35 (Dec. 1999) (setting forth number of hours of legal services
provided by Montana Prepaid Legal Services plan in exchange for monthly $16
premium).
47. Heid & Misulovin, supra note 44, at 342-43 (describing range of legal services
covered by various prepaid legal services plans).
48. See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent In an Era of Health
Care Cost Containment, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 261,282 (1999).
49. According to a recent survey, approximately eighteen million Americans are
covered by some sort of prepaid legal services plan. See National Resource Center for
Consumers of Legal Services, 2000 Legal Services Plan Census 1 (2000), at
http.//www.nrccls.org/PublicationsfLegal-Censuslegal_census.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2001) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). This is in comparison to a total
American population of more than 281 million. See http-//factfinder.census.gov/servlet
/BasicFactsServlet (last visited Oct. 15,2001).
50. See Sheldon M. Retchin, Variations in Medicare Health Maintenance
Organizations, 281 JAMA 755 (1999) (discussing the numerous forms in which
managed health care entities are organized).
51. See Hall, supra note 37, at 101-02, 101 n.22 (citing Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care
2001]
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contract with loose collections of practitioners or physician networks
to provide medical services to the plan's members 2 In turn, for the
most part it is employers, pension plans, or government entities that
contract with the managed care plans to provide medical services to
their employees or recipients of public benefits.53 Institutional entities
which facilitate the provision of medical services from physicians to
patients-including health maintenance organizations, physician
provider networks, insurance companies, employers, pension plans,
and government entities-may have both economic incentives and
legal obligations to provide information to patients that will be helpful
to them in selecting physicians.- For example, in his detailed analysis
of medical disclosure laws, Professor William Sage describes the
plethora of information that New York law requires be provided to
him regarding the doctors, hospitals, and treatments available to him
as a member of the health plan offered by his employer, Columbia
University Law School.55
By contrast, to the extent that there are intermediary institutions
involved in the delivery of legal services, they lack similar incentives
or legal obligations to provide information to potential clients that will
aid them in their selection of an attorney. As pointed out above,
prepaid legal services plans remain relatively marginal.56 Moreover,
given that most such plans have opted for a referral network structure
rather than a primary care provider structure, it is not clear that the
plans have much of an incentive to provide extensive information
regarding available attorneys. Indeed, the best known group legal
services plan is that offered by the AARP. 7 However, a visit to the
AARP's Web site does not provide any specific information beyond
the name, contact information, and areas of practice of the listed
Industry, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 445,446 & n.8 (1987)).
52. See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health
Care System, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 159,191-95 (Spring 1997).
53. As of 1998, 76% of Americans with health insurance received that coverage
through their employment. Sage, Regulating Through Information, supra note 37, at
1720 & n.46 (citing Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Health Care Spending
and the Medicare Program: A Data Book 19 (1998)). Another 16% received
insurance from government sources (mostly Medicaid), and 8% purchased their own
health insurance. Id. at 1720. Virtually all Americans over the age of 65 are eligible
for Medicare. Id. at 1720 n.46. Of course, approximately one-sixth of the American
population lacks any health insurance coverage. Id. at 1703,1815 & n.430.
54. See id. at 1737-38.
55. Id. at 1704.
56. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. But see Heid & Misulovin, supra
note 44, at 336-40 (pointing to an increasing number of employers providing prepaid
legal services plans to employees as a fringe benefit, and predicting further growth in
the future). Heid and Misulovin do not discuss what, if any, information is provided
by employers to employees regarding the individual lawyers participating in the plans.
Heid & Misulovin, supra note 44.
57. See Moore & Kolasa, supra note 42, at 503.
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lawyers. 8  Moreover, in instances where government is an
intermediary to providing legal services directly to individuals, such as
in legal services and public defender programs, the client rarely has a
choice of attorneys, so providing background information about the
attorneys for purposes of attorney selection is beside the point.
According to the Martindale-Hubbell survey, after consulting
family and friends, the favored secondary resource in finding a lawyer
is the yellow pages.5 9 Of course, beyond areas of practice there is little
substantive information in the yellow pages that would assist a person
in selecting an appropriate attorney. Individuals also turn to other
forms of advertising as a secondary source in their search for a
lawyer.' Yet, while there has been a proliferation of advertising by
lawyers following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona,61 such advertising, whether it takes the form of
late-night television commercials or direct mailings, provides little
information that would be of use to persons in finding appropriate and
competent representation. 62
Attorney directories offer little more in the way of useful
information. While directories such as Martindale-Hubbell do
provide basic background information on attorneys-such as when
and where they graduated from law school, bar admissions, and fields
of practice-such sources do not provide information that might
reflect poorly upon the listed attorneys, such as disciplinary actions,
malpractice payments, or criminal convictions." Given that most
58. See, e.g., http://vwvwv.aarp.org/lsn/Florida+-+Ft.+Lauderdale.html (listing
participating lawyers in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida) (last visited Oct. 15, 2001).
59. Lawyers in America, supra note 26. at 8, 25 (stating that 50% of those
surveyed indicated that they would check the yellow pages as a secondary resource in
looking for an attorney).
60. According to the Martindale-Hubbell survey, 33% of those surveyed would
refer to television, radio, or print advertisements as a secondary resource to help them
to find a lawyer. See id. at 25.
61. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Court held that truthful advertising by
attorneys is a form of constitutionally protected speech, and that blanket bans on such
advertising are unconstitutional. Id. at 382-83. In a series of cases subsequent to
Bates, the Court has generally upheld particular attorney advertising practices against
regulatory efforts by state bar authorities. See generally Morton, supra note 23. at 311-
13.
62. Morton, supra note 23, at 295. Some argue that lawyers should be required to
disclose certain information regarding discipline and malpractice proceedings in their
advertisements. See Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer Discipline and
"Disclosure Advertising": Toward a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L Rev. 351, 396 (1994); Sara
Murray, Comment, The Whole Truth or Nothing But the Truth? Should Attorneys
Who Advertise Be Required to Disclose Prior Disciplinar, Actions Taken Against
Them?, 21 St. Mary's L.J. 953,966 (1990).
63. Morton, supra note 23, at 299. Martindale-Hubbell does offer its own quality
rating system based upon oral or written reviews by other attorneys. See, e.g., 1 The
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory xv-xvi (2001). Lawyers receive both a "legal
ability rating" and a "general recommendation" rating. Id. In the former category,
20011
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directories rely on voluntary submissions by attorneys, it is hard to see
how they would survive if they included such adverse information.
Another manner in which consumers of legal services seek
attorneys is through lawyer referral services.6  The typical lawyer
referral service is operated on a not-for-profit basis by a local bar
association,65 although increasingly for-profit lawyer referral services
have come into being.' Typically, a person looking for a lawyer
contacts the referral service and self-identifies the problem area."
The potential client is then referred to the next lawyer in line68 who
has expressed a willingness to take cases in the problem area
identified by the client.69 Referral services rarely require the attorney
to demonstrate any particular expertise or experience in a problem
area in order to receive referrals in that area.7 Usually only active
membership in the bar in good standing, and perhaps a certain
amount of malpractice insurance coverage, is required of the
participating lawyers in the referral service.7' Moreover, no effort is
made to match particular attorney competencies or characteristics to
those of the potential client or case.72 Additionally, the referral
lawyers can receive a "C" (fair to high); "B" (high to very high) or an "A" (very high
to preeminent). Id. In the latter category, lawyers can receive a "V" rating ("very
high"). Id. Taken together, the highest rating that an attorney can receive is an "AV"
rating. However, Martindale-Hubbell does not make any direct claim that "AV"
rated attorneys are superior to other attorneys, and no study to date has supported
such a claim. To the contrary, at least one study has suggested that "AV" rated
lawyers are no less likely to be sued for malpractice than other lawyers. See Manuel
R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 38-39
(1995) [hereinafter Ramos, No Lawyer or Client Is Safe].
64. Morton, supra note 23, at 301.
65. Id.; see also Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 7.2 cmt. 6 (1983) (approving
payment of charges to join not-for-profit lawyer referral services).
66. Morton, supra note 23, at 302; see also Rules Regulating Fla. Bar 4-7.11
(providing for for-profit lawyer referral services).
67. This procedure is somewhat troubling, given that prospective clients are often
poorly situated to diagnose their own legal problems. See supra notes 30-34 and
accompanying text. Moreover, personnel who work for the referral service, even if
lawyers themselves, are likely to lump client problems into pre-existing categories of
cases, without full consideration of the details of the clients' problem or the
appropriateness of such categorizations. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.. 38
Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
68. In this regard, lawyer referral services work similarly to the English "taxi"
system as it relates to barristers' services. See Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of
Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession 60 & n.23 (2000).
69. Morton, supra note 23, at 301.
70. Id. A notable exception is the AARP's Lawyer Referral Network, which,
from its inception, required participating lawyers to have a minimum of four years of
practice experience, devote at least 20% of their practice to the type of cases for
which referrals will be offered, and carry a minimum threshold amount of malpractice
insurance. See Moore & Kolasa, supra note 42, at 539.
71. Morton, supra note 23, at 301.
72. Id. at 301-03.
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service does not provide any information about the referred lawyer of
the type that would be contained in a physician profile v-
Increased development of the Internet has opened up a variety of
additional options for persons seeking attorneys.74 Of course, much of
the information available to potential consumers of legal services over
the Internet is fundamentally the same as that available via traditional
resources,75 only delivered through a different medium. For example,
lawyers advertise over the Internet, attorney directories are available
on-line,76 and both for-profit and not-for-profit attorney referral
services operate on-line. The same limitations each of these sources
present in helping persons find appropriate legal representation apply
equally in the on-line environment and the traditional "bricks and
mortar" world. The Internet has also produced non-traditional means
of obtaining legal services. For example, consumers may receive legal
advice or other forms of less-than-full-service legal representation
over the Internet.' However, in such contexts, the client is likely to
know even less about the person providing the legal services than in
the traditional context where at least a face-to-face meeting is
involved. Furthermore, while such developments may ultimately go a
long way toward providing more affordable and readily available legal
assistance to persons of modest means,75 they are not likely to do so by
making it easier for individuals to find specific providers of legal
services best suited to their particular legal needs.
73. See id. Cf. supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text (discussing the relatively
extensive requirements of Florida's physician profiles).
74. Thirty-four percent of the persons surveyed on behalf of Martindale-Hubbell
indicated that they would use the Internet as a secondary resource in searching for a
lawyer. Lawyers in America, supra note 26, at 25. As one would imagine, there are
significant age-based differences in persons' willingness to turn to the Internet as a
resource. Thus, 52% of those aged twenty-six to twenty-nine were found likely to
search the Internet as a secondary resource when looking for a lawyer, whereas, only
15% of those fifty-two years of age or older were likely to turn to the Internet for
assistance. Id. at 55.
75. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 25.
77. See Richard Zorza, Re-conceptualizing the Relationship Between Legal Ethics
and Technological Innovation in Legal Practice: From Threat to Opportunit'. 67
Fordham L. Rev. 2659, 2663 & n.16 (1999). In addition to providing some
information to help persons to find lawyers. the Internet has also made available a
tremendous amount of raw legal information that may make it easier for persons to
represent themselves, rather than seeking the services of a lawyer. See id. at 2663-64.
2668-69. Interactive forms, pleadings, and other legal documents may further
facilitate self-representation. Id. at 2668-69. For a more detailed discussion of the
issues presented by self-representation in family law cases, see Steven Berenson, A
Family Law Residency Program?: A Modest Proposal in Response to the Chdlenge
Presented by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court. 32 Rutgers LJ. (forthcoming
December 2001).
78. See Zorza, supra note 77.
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In light of the above discussion, it appears that there is ample need
for additional sources of information valuable to middle-income
persons selecting an attorney. Perhaps "lawyer profiles," along the
lines of the physician profiles that have begun to appear in numerous
states around the country, could serve that purpose.
II. PHYSICIAN PROFILES
Massachusetts was the first state to adopt physician profile
legislation.79 In 1996, Massachusetts established a toll-free telephone
number from which consumers of health care services could obtain
certain information about Massachusetts health care providers., Four
categories of data were provided by the Massachusetts hotline. The
first was factual practitioner data, including personal information
about the provider, educational and professional background, as well
as any awards, honors, or specialty training or certifications."' The
next category of data included the practitioner's malpractice claims
history."m  The hotline disclosed payments relating to claims of
malpractice. However, rather than disclosing the specific amount of
the payment, the hotline identified whether the payment was above
average, below average, or average. 3 The hotline also contained a
disclaimer stating that malpractice payments may be unrelated to
professional competence, and information regarding the percentage of
practitioners in a particular specialty area who have made malpractice
payments." The third category of information provided by the
Massachusetts hotline pertained to licensing board and hospital
disciplinary actions."5 The final category of information available
through the Massachusetts hotline included information regarding
criminal misdemeanor and felony convictions. 6 The information
disclosed included all criminal convictions, not only those directly
related to the delivery of medical services. The Massachusetts
hotline also excluded categories of arguably relevant information,
79. Ann Stewart, Comment, Physician Profiles: Consumer Protection or Excessive
Exposure?, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 957, 958 (1998).
80. Id. at 975. For a history of the legislation creating the Massachusetts hotline,
see id. at 975-76.
81. Id. at 976.
82. Id. at 977.
83. Stewart, supra note 79, at 977. The statute did not specify the method the
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine should use to determine the
"average" claims payment. Id. at 978. The Board has apparently chosen to compare
malpractice payments made by physicians within a given specialty in order to
determine average, above average, and below average claims payments. See
http://www.massmedboard.org/malpractice.htm (last visited Oct. 15,2001).
84. Stewart, supra note 79, at 977.
85. Id. at 981.
86. Id. at 987.
87. Stewart, supra note 79, at 987.
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including information relating to malpractice or disciplinary claims
filed but not resolved, information relating to substance abuse by the
provider, and provider-specific outcome data.' Massachusetts'
physician profiles became available over the Internet in May 1997.Y
Following the lead of Massachusetts and Florida, approximately
two dozen states have provided for some form of publicly accessible
physician profiles 0 There is a great deal of variety in the information
that is included in state physician profiles. Information that may be
included ranges from the doctor's demographic and educational
background, licenses, and certifications, to malpractice suits, state
licensing, or peer review disciplinary actions, and criminal
convictions.91 Massachusetts and Florida represent one end of the
continuum, providing the widest range of information about each
practitioner. In fact, Massachusetts and Florida are presently the only
states that include information relating to malpractice actions in their
physician profiles. California represents an intermediate position,
providing disciplinary but not malpractice information about profiled
physicians.2 New York is the latest major state to approve on-line
physician profiles.93
A. Conditions Underlying the Movement Toward Physician Profiles
A number of conditions paved the way for the adoption of
physician profile legislation. These included the development of
informed consent doctrine, the "crises" in medical malpractice and
peer review, and the creation of the National Practitioner Data Bank.
Each of these conditions is discussed below.'
1. The Development of Informed Consent Doctrine
Public acknowledgment that patients or other consumers of health
care services might make worthwhile use of information relating to
the background, performance, or practices of their health care
88. Stewart, supra note 79, at 988.
89. David Armstrong, Background Profiles on Mass. Physicians Available on
Internet, Boston Globe, May 1. 1997, at B2.
90. Kristen Hallam, Physicians Caught in the Web; Thanks to Internet, Doc
Disciplinary Data Now Just a Mouse Click Away. Mod. Healthcare, Sept. 4, 2000, at
30.
91. See The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Inc.. Report
of the Special Committee on Physician Profiling 5-9 (1999), http:/lw.fsmb.org/
physicianprofilepd.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2001) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter FSMB Report].
92. Patricia Simms, It's Still Not Easy to Get Data on Doctors; There's Some
Information Online, But It's Pretty Sketchy, Wis. St. J., Mar. 11,2001, at Al.
93. Linda Boone Hunt, Open the Door; New York Law Part of Movement to
Release Disciplinary Data, Modem Physician, Jan. 1, 2001, at 10.
94. See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.4.
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providers is a relatively recent phenomenon. Historically, the flow of
information in the physician-patient relationship, as was the case with
regard to other types of professional relationships, was governed by
the "Professionalism Paradigm." 95 Under this model, because patients
lack the training and sophistication necessary to comprehend the
esoteric knowledge involved in the practice of medicine, there is little
to be gained by efforts on the part of doctors to educate patients or to
provide explanations regarding the medical issues or treatment
alternatives implicated by the patients' situations. For similar reasons,
there was thought to be little to be gained from significant patient
input regarding the course of treatment to be undertaken by the
physician.
Though the possession of esoteric knowledge continues to be one of
the hallmarks of medical practice, recent decades have seen inroads
made into the view that doctors are able to use this knowledge in a
manner that results in certain, non-contingent, and consistent
judgments regarding preferred courses of treatment in the cases of
particular patients. 6 Rather, evidence has developed that doctors
make highly contingent, prudential judgments regarding the
appropriate course of treatment in particular circumstances.' In such
an environment, it has come to be believed that patients' autonomy
interests require that they be educated and informed, and have input
regarding the treatment choices and alternatives available to their
medical practitioners. Similarly, it has come to be believed that
patient input can have salutary effects on the quality of treatment
decision making in the context of medical uncertainty. Indeed, this
trend has been evidenced in areas of medical law including informed
consent, discipline and malpractice, and peer review.
The law of informed consent has its origins in the common law tort
of battery, and the notion that persons have an absolute right of
control over the physical integrity of their bodies. 98 However, at least
in theory, the doctrine has expanded into a broader right of
participation by patients in medical decision making.99 Some have
95. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 683, 741 (1991); Esekiel J.
Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Preserving Community in Health Care, 22 J. Health
Pol., Pol'y & L. 147, 148 (1997); Stewart, supra note 79, at 957.
97. This view is consistent with Kuhn's broader conclusion that scientific
knowledge is in fact no less contingent, and no more immutable, than knowledge in
the social sciences, which were traditionally considered to result in a softer form of
"truth" than "hard science." See generally Kuhn, supra note 30.
98. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent
and the Legal Profession, 128 U. Pa. L, Rev. 41, 44 & n.12 (1979) (citing Schloendorf
v. Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
99. Id. at 48. In practice, doctors have resisted the substantially increased burdens
of communication placed upon them by the evolving standard. See generally Jay Katz,
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even argued for a broadening of the right of informed consent to a
protected interest in patient choice.' A more restricted contention
that has been made, yet one that is more directly germane to this
paper, is that the right of informed consent includes a right on the part
of the patient to information concerning the doctor's background and
performance record.'' Physician profiles arguably satisfy the
requirements of this expanded conception of informed consent by
providing patients with relevant background information regarding
their doctors.
2. The "Crisis" in Medical Malpractice
The historical veneer of medical certainty was also undermined by a
series of disclosures during the 1980s revealing a much greater
incidence of medical negligence than had previously been
acknowledged publicly. 2  Though discussions of medical malpractice
"crises" were longstanding,'"3 there was, in fact, a great increase in
medical malpractice litigation during the '80s. From 1975 to 1986, the
number of malpractice claims per 100 physicians increased more than
10% per year." Indeed, more medical malpractice cases were filed
between 1977 and 1987 than in the previous history of American tort
law. t5 Naturally, this great expansion led to a corresponding increase
in the cost of premiums paid for medical malpractice insurance. ' '
While there was much controversy surrounding the above discussed
figures, and a great deal of dispute over whether, in fact, a "crisis" in
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (2d ed. 1986); Aaron Twerski & Neil Cohen,
The Second Revolution in Infonned Consent: Comparing Physicians to Each Other. 94
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1,3 n.4 (1999).
100. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Front lnformed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 95 Yale L.J. 219 (1985).
101. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 99. But see Sage, Regulting Through
Information, supra note 37, at 1750 n.172 (citing cases refusing to hold doctors liable
for failure to disclose physician specific information); Kate Sievert Cook. Casenote,
Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland: IWhy You Should Always Ask Your
Urologist if He Is a Cocaine Addict, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1159 (2001).
102. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101(1)
(1994) ("The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve
the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater
efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State.")
103. J. Douglas Peters et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Medical and Legal
Professions' Experiences and Perceptions of Medical and Legal Malpractice. 19 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 601, 602 & n.2 (1986).
104. Elisabeth Ryzen. The National Practitioner Data Batik: Problems and
Proposed Reforms. 13 J. Legal Med. 409, 411 (1992) (citing Danzon, Malpractice
Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener?, in Tort Law and the Public
Interest 179 (P. Schuck ed., 1991)).
105. Id. (citing P. Huber, The Legal Revolution and its Consequences 9 (1988)).
106. Id. at 412.
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malpractice existed,"° there was, at a minimum, a public perception
at this time that "something needed to be done" about adverse
medical results relating to physician negligence.
There is more recent evidence that medical errors continue to occur
at an alarming rate. In a 1999 report, the National Academy of
Sciences' Institute of Medicine ("IOM") estimated that between
44,000 and 98,000 American hospital patients die each year due to
medical errors. 8 This report has further intensified efforts toward
increased disclosure to medical patients. For example, the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
("JCAHO") subsequently enacted a rule requiring hospitals to tell
patients when they have been the victims of medical errors."
Advancement of physician profile legislation has also been spurred by
release of the IOM report.
3. Ineffective Peer Review
Paralleling the mid-1980s "crisis" in medical malpractice was a
perceived crisis in peer review of medical practitioners. Peer review is
the process by which doctors monitor and review the work of their
colleagues." 0 Peer review typically takes place in a hospital setting
and consists of physicians on the hospital's peer review committee
reviewing their colleagues on the hospital's staff.' Peer review is
thought to have the potential to be a particularly effective means of
monitoring the quality of medical services, as the reviewing physicians
work side by side with the physicians under review." 2
However, a number of factors are considered to have inhibited peer
review from reaching its full potential. First, doctors are reluctant to
pass judgment on their colleagues."' Second, reviewers are reluctant
to impose strict sanctions, given the devastating effect suspension or
withdrawal of hospital privileges might have on the practice of a
colleague." 4 Also, peer reviewers are generally not compensated for
their often time consuming work." 5 Finally, in the past, members of
107. Id. at 430.
108. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Medical System 1 (Linda T. Kohn ct al.
eds., 1999). This estimate is based on empirical studies conducted in Colorado, Utah,
and New York. Id. at 1 & nn.2-3.
109. See Robert Davis, Hospital Mistakes Must Be Disclosed; Accreditation at Risk
if Patients Aren't Told, USA Today, June 28,2001, at 1A.
110. Adler, supra note 96, at 696.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 697. But see Susan 0. Schuetzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost
But No Benefit-Is it Time for a Change?, 25 Am. J.L. and Med. 7 (1999) (criticizing
peer review).





peer review committees were often sued under a variety of theories by
doctors subject to adverse peer review determinations."' Moreover,
where states passed legislation providing immunity for physicians
involved in the peer review process, physicians denied hospital
privileges took to attacking the peer review process on antitrust
grounds.11 7
Another major problem relating to peer review that was perceived
in the mid-1980s concerned the lack of communication and
cooperation between licensing authorities for medical practitioners
across state lines, as well as a perceived lack of communication among
peer review authorities. For example, it was perceived that a medical
practitioner who lost his or her license to practice in one state as the
result of incompetence, might simply move across the state line and
receive a new license to practice medicine in the new state, without
regard to any prior misfeasance."" It was similarly thought that
doctors could avoid the harsh results of adverse peer review
determinations simply by seeking admitting or practice privileges at
other institutions.
4. The National Practitioner Data Bank
In order to address the problems of migratory incompetent doctors
and ineffective peer review, in 1986 Congress enacted the Health Care
Quality Improvement Act ("HCQIA")," 9 which "was designed both
to provide for effective peer review and interstate monitoring of
incompetent physicians, and to grant qualified immunity from
damages for those who participate in peer review activities."' 2"
Among other provisions, the HCQIA provided for the establishment
of a National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), which was designed
to provide a clearinghouse for information regarding licensing,
disciplinary action, and peer review regarding all medical
practitioners.
Three general categories of information must be reported to the
NPDB: medical malpractice payments, licensing actions, and adverse
actions by health care entities.12 1 Any payment made to a complaining
person as a result of a medical malpractice claim must be reported to
the NPDB, whether made by an individual or an insurance
116. Id. at 698. Such theories include defamation, denial of due process, and
tortious interference with business relations. Id.
117. Id.
11& Id. at 692.
119. See supra note 102; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101 (1994).
120. Ruth E. Flynn, Demand for Public Access to the National Practitioner Data
Bank" Consumers Sound Their Own Death Cry, 18 Hamline J. Pub. L & Pol'y 251.
251-52 (1996) (quoting Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728,733 (9th Cir. 1992)).
121. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 416.
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company. 22 There is no minimum threshold that must be met in order
to trigger the reporting requirement. 23 Any disciplinary actions taken
by state medical boards must also be reported to the NPDB, if they
relate to "professional competence or professional conduct.'12 4 Such
actions include "license revocations, suspensions, censures,
reprimands, probation, and voluntary surrenders."'' 25 Finally, health
care entities that engage in professional review activities must report
actions that adversely effect a physician's clinical privileges for a
period of more than thirty days, when such actions arise out of the
peer review process and are based upon the physician's professional
competence or professional conduct. 26
From its inception, information contained in the NPDB has not
been available to the public. 27 Such secrecy was justified on grounds
that opening up the data bank's records to public scrutiny would
defeat the Act's primary purpose of increasing the involvement in and
reliability of peer review activities.128 Despite this fact, numerous
proposals have been made since the Act's inception to provide public
access to some or all of the information contained in the data bank. 29
Most recently, Congressman Thomas Bliley of Virginia proposed
legislation to open up the data bank. 3° None of the proposals to
make the information contained in the data bank available to the
public have been successful, and it does not appear that granting
public access is likely to be approved anytime soon.'3 ' Nonetheless,
the very existence of a single source containing the wealth of
information thought to be relevant to issues of physician choice, along
with the efforts to open up the data bank, seem to have created a
momentum that has helped pave the way for state physician
profiles.'32 Indeed, many of the same entities and organizations that
have had their efforts to provide access to the data bank thwarted at
the federal level have found success in obtaining access to similar
information through efforts at the state legislative level.133
122. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. 60.7 (1991)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 417 (citing 45 C.F.R. 60.8 (1991)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 418 (citing 45 C.F.R. 60.9 (1991)).
127. Flynn, supra note 120, at 252.
128. Id. at 253.
129. Julie Barker Pape, Note, Physician Data Banks: The Public's Right to Know
Versus the Physician's Right to Privacy, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 975, 982 (1999).
130. Bliley's proposed legislation was designated H.R. 5122 (2000). See, e.g., Public
Access to the National Practitioner Data Bank: Hearing Before the House Commerce
Comm., 106th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2000) (prepared testimony of Richard F. Corlin, M.D..
President-Elect, American Medical Association).
131. Pape, supra note 129, at 982.
132. Id. at 983; see also Ryzen, supra note 104, at 455.
133. Note that subsequent to the development of the data bank, a number of
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B. Arguments For and Against Physician Profiles
Numerous arguments have been made both in favor of and against
providing public access to physician profiles. These arguments can be
grouped into four general categories. The first category of arguments
relates to consumer sovereignty and autonomy. The second category
focuses on the impact of physician profiles on medical practice. A
third category focuses on physicians' privacy interests. A final
category of arguments focuses on the costs and logistical challenges
involved in compiling and maintaining accurate physician profiles. A
discussion of these arguments follows."
1. Consumer Sovereignty and Autonomy
The most basic argument in favor of physician profiles focuses on
patients as consumers of medical services. Proponents of the
consumer protection perspective regard the purchase and sale of
medical services in the same manner as any other consumer
transaction. 135  Within that framework, it is argued that the more
information consumers have, the more efficient purchasing decisions
they will make. Thus, the more information about the providers of
medical services that is available to consumers, the better. Also,
consistent with the above discussion of the informed consent
doctrine,36 proponents of public access to physician profiles argue
that the information contained in such profiles is germane to patient
decision making regarding the appropriate course of medical
treatment to be given by a particular provider. Providing such
information serves patients' autonomy interests.
Opponents of physician profiles, on the other hand, argue that
rather than providing valuable information that will help consumers in
selecting a physician, physician profiles are likely to have the opposite
effect. In particular, such opponents focus on the confusing nature of
private sources, including both non-profit advocacy groups and for-profit business
entities, established a variety of databases that are available to the public, either for
free or for a fee, containing information similar to that contained in the data bank.
See, e.g., Public Citizen Group, 20,125 Questionable Doctors Disciplined by State and
Federal Governments (2000); The American Board of Medical Specialties,
http://www.abms.org (last visited Oct. 15, 2001), American Medical Association,
AMA Physician Select, httpJ/www.ama-assn.orglapsfamahg.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2001); HealthGrades, Physician Profiles, http'./hwwv.healthgrades.com (last visited
Oct. 15, 2001); Search Pointe, http:/hvw'%v.searchpointe.com (last visited Oct. 15,
2001); see also FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 4; Jeff Sturgeon, Here's How to Check
Out a Physician, Roanoke Times & World News. Feb. 11, 2001, at 2.
134. Infra Parts II.B.1-II.B.4.
135. See, e.g., Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 96. at 156.
136. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Lawrence Smarr, A Comparative Assessmnent of
the PIAA Data Sharing Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy,
Purpose and Application, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 59,66-72 (1997).
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malpractice and disciplinary information contained in physician
profiles. Indeed, a number of commentators have argued that the
presentation of the limited amount of information regarding
malpractice judgments and settlements that is made available to
members of the public through physician profiles is so likely to be
misleading that it would be better if such information were not
provided at all.'37
As discussed above, data banks vary in terms of their reporting
requirements for malpractice payments-some do not require
reporting of such payments at all, others require reporting of all
malpractice payments regardless how small, and others only of
payments above a certain threshold amount. 138 In the latter case, it is
argued that payments below the threshold amount reflect only the
"nuisance value" of the claim,'39 and therefore, do not provide any
reliable indication that the payer has in fact committed medical
malpractice. It has also been argued that even larger settlements are a
poor indication that malpractice has actually occurred. 4 It is also
contended that past malpractice claims may be poor predictors of
future claims. 4' It has been further argued that rather than
evidencing physician incompetence, malpractice claims are most
directly influenced by medical specialty and geographic location. For
example, 73% of all OB/GYNs have been sued at least once.'
However, according to 1991 data, while the average obstetrician had
137. Flynn, supra note 120, at 276.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
139. The term "nuisance value" refers to those costs that would have to be incurred
to dispose of even the most baseless claim of malpractice. See Ryzen, supra note 104,
at 430. Such costs might include attorneys fees, expert witness fees, and the like.
140. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 431; Flynn, supra note 120, at 277. At least one
study concluded that the likelihood of malpractice litigation being pursued is more
greatly influenced by the doctor's interpersonal skills than by the technical quality of
the services provided. Flynn, supra note 120, at 277 (citing 6 Health News Daily, Nov.
23, 1994, at 227 (citing studies by Gerald Hickson, M.D., et al.)); see also Randall R.
Bovbjerg & Kenneth R. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physicians' Malpractice
Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predict the Future?, 272 JAMA 1421
(1994) (concluding that previous claims, regardless of whether they resulted in
payments or not, are indicative of physicians with troubled relationships with their
patients). For a description of the Bovbjerg and Petronis study, see Stewart, supra
note 79, at 979-81.
141. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 432 (citing Rolph, et al., Malpractice Claims Data as
a Quality Improvement Tool II: Is Targeting Effective?, 266 JAMA 2093 (1991)). But
see Bovbjerg & Petronis, supra note 140, at 1425 (concluding that a history of prior
malpractice claims is strongly predictive of a likelihood of future claims against a
practitioner).
142. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 430 (citing Medical Malpractice: Hearings on H.R.
5110: Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 18 and July 15, 1986)).
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been sued three times, the average New York State obstetrician had
been sued eight times.'43
Similar arguments have been made regarding the misleading nature
of and inconsistency among disciplinary actions taken by medical
licensing boards.'" More particularly, it may be difficult for
consumers to determine the appropriate amount of weight to attach to
disciplinary sanctions without knowledge of the frequency or severity
of similar sanctions in the relevant jurisdiction. For example, the most
active state medical board in the country, among states with more
than 2000 practicing physicians, appears to be that of Kentucky, which
reported approximately 8.23 disciplinary actions per 1000 physicians
in the year 2000.111 The least active board was that of Idaho, with only
1.43 actions per 1000 physicians." 6 In between these extremes, there
is a great deal of variability in state medical board disciplinary activity.
Finally, the malpractice and disciplinary information contained in
physician profiles may be presented in a manner that deprives it of
much of its informational value. Most state physician profiles do not
contain any information relating to the facts or circumstances of the
disciplinary or malpractice action. Rather, all that is usually reported
is the outcome (e.g., $10,000 settlement, six-month suspension, etc.) It
is argued that consumers can take little away from a report of the
outcome of disciplinary or malpractice proceedings without knowing
anything about the facts of the underlying matter."7
One way that proponents of practitioner profiles have attempted to
address some of the opposing arguments discussed above is by
advocating for disclaimer language to be included in the practitioner
profile along with any information relating to malpractice payments.
As mentioned earlier, such language must be included in Florida's
143. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 430 (citing Gastel, Medical Malpractice Insurance
Information Institute, New York, Nov. 1991).
144. Stewart, supra note 79, at 985. The Hickson study, supra note 140. was unable
to document a correlation between prior disciplinary action and quality of subsequent
care.
145. This figure represents the FSMB's Composite Action Index ("CAI") for 2000.
See Federation of State Medical Boards, Summary of 2000 Board Actions (Apr. 6.
2001), http://wwv.fsmb.org/PDFFiles200lSBA.pdf (on file with the Fordhant Law
Review). The CAI, in turn, represents the arithmetic mean of four other state activity
ratios: 1) total actions divided by total licensed physicians; 2) total actions divided by
practicing in-state physicians; 3) total prejudicial actions divided by total licensed
physicians; and 4) total prejudicial actions divided by practicing in-state physicians. Id.
A prejudicial action includes any loss or restriction of a license or license privilege or
any penalty or reprimand to an individual physician. Id. The CAI is purported to be a
useful way to measure a state board's disciplinary activity over time. However, since
the CAI is not claimed to be reliable in jurisdictions with less than 2000 practicing
physicians, id., those figures are not referred to in the above discussion.
146. Id.
147. Stewart, supra note 79, at 985-86.
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practitioner profile.'48 Massachusetts requires a disclaimer of even
greater detail than the Florida disclaimer.'49 Additionally, some have
suggested including information regarding malpractice-payment
frequency in certain specialty practice fields. 5 One can certainly
question the impact that such boilerplate disclaimer language is likely
to have on the readers of practitioner profiles. Indeed, such
disclaimers seem about as likely to be effective as jury instructions to
disregard prior testimony. Nonetheless, for the proponents of
practitioner profiles, the possibly misleading quality of malpractice
payment and disciplinary information is outweighed by the marginal
benefit to consumers that such information provides in making
decisions regarding medical practitioners. 51
2. Impact on Medical Practice
Proponents of physician profiles contend that practitioners are
likely to be more careful and practice more proficiently if they are
aware that adverse consequences, whether in terms of discipline or
malpractice, are likely to be made readily accessible to prospective
patients. 52  Ultimately, market forces may drive incompetent
practitioners out of business, if consumers are aware of, and therefore
hold such practitioners accountable for, unacceptable performance
and results.
However, opponents of physician profiles argue that providing
public access to physician profiles will adversely impact medical
practice. First, some argue that physicians will unduly practice
"defensive medicine" in order to avoid any incidents that might
ultimately lead to reportable information. 5 3 Second, others argue that
physicians are more likely to litigate cases that formerly would have
settled, in order to avoid public disclosure of the settlement." 4
Additionally, some argue that the availability to plaintiffs' lawyers of
information regarding previous malpractice claims will result in an
increase in the number of claims filed.' Obviously, doctors spending
more time in courtrooms or working on the defense of medical
148. See supra note 9.
149. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 983 n.170, for the text of the Massachusetts
disclaimer.
150. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 34, at 130; Pape, supra note 129, at 1027.
151. See FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 7-8; Miller, supra note 34, at 129-30;
Ryzen, supra note 104, at 457.
152. See Adler, supra note 96, at 740; Stewart, supra note 79, at 973.
153. Ryzen, supra note 104, at 447-48.
154. Pape, supra note 129, at 989-90; Ryzen, supra note 104, at 434; Flynn, supra
note 120, at 275-76.
155. See Ryzen, supra note 104, at 456 & n.238.
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malpractice litigation will not have a salutary effect on the delivery of
medical services to patients.
Third, some argue that public access to physician profiles will harm
the peer review process, which, as discussed above, many view as
being an important factor in improving medical practice." The peer
review process depends, at least in part, on the self-reporting of data
by the physicians subject to review."v However, physicians may be
reluctant to provide all of the information necessary for effective peer
review if they are concerned that the information may become
publicly available as part of their physician profiles. ' Additionally, it
has been argued that hospitals have decreased the incidence of
disciplinary action affecting hospital privileges so as to avoid having to
report such data to the NPDB. 59 Finally, doctors may be even more
reluctant to take adverse action with regard to their peers if the results
of the peer review action will be available to the public."'
In response, it can be noted that physicians already practice
"defensive medicine," have done so since at least the increase in
malpractice litigation in the 1980s described above, " ' and are likely to
continue to do so in the future, with or without practitioner profiles.
And while it may be too early to draw any grand conclusions, it does
not appear that the states that have already instituted practitioner
profiles have witnessed an increase in malpractice litigation activity.
For example, the Executive Director of Massachusetts' Board of
156. See supra text accompanying note 112: see also Pape. supra note 129, at 990.
157. Pape. supra note 129, at 990-91.
158. Id. at 990.
159. Sage, Regulating Through Infonnation. supra note 37, at 1795 n.353 (citing
Laura-Mae Baldwin, Hospital Peer Review and the National Practitioner Data Bank:
Clinical Privileges Action Reports, 282 JAMA 349 (1999)). Additionally, Sage
contends that some managed care physicians insisted on having "no cause"
termination provisions inserted in their employment contracts in order to prevent
incurring reportable terminations from managed care panels. I. (citing Alice G.
Gosfield, Presentation to the American Medical Association (Feb. 1993)).
Apparently, deals are also worked out with HMOs on a case-by-case basis to allow
doctors to resign from a health plan rather than incur reportable discipline. See
Robert Pear, Inept Physicians Are Rarely Listed as Law Requires. N.Y. Times, May
29,2001, at Al.
Even more troubling is a recent report by the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services demonstrating extremely low levels of
compliance with the HCQIA's reporting requirements by both HMOs and hospitals,
even where discipline is imposed. See Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of Inspector General, Managed Care Organization Nonreporting to the
National Practitioner Data Bank: A Signal for Broader Concern (May 2001).
According to the report. from 1990-99, HMOs reported a total of only 715 adverse
actions to the NPDB, and 84% of HMOs reported no adverse actions at all. I. at i.
Hospital reporting is not much better-as of the year 2000, 60% of hospitals had
never reported an adverse action to the NPDB. Id. at 2.
160. See Flynn, supra note 120. at 275.
161. Supra Part II.A.2.
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Registration in Medicine testified before Congress that rather than
leading to an increase in frivolous malpractice claims, the
Massachusetts rate for malpractice payments actually decreased by
12.4% since establishment of the profiles, 62 more than twice the rate
of decrease nationally.'63 Nor does there appear to have been an
adverse effect on peer review activities from existing practitioner
profile legislation. Indeed, the manager of the Florida Department of
Health's practitioner regulation program similarly testified before
Congress as to an absence of any negative consequences resulting
from implementation of Florida's practitioner profile program.164
3. Physician Privacy
Opponents of physician profiles have argued that public access to
physician profiles results in a violation of the physicians' privacy
rights. 65 To the extent that profiles include information that might be
highly embarrassing to physicians, such as criminal convictions, this
argument has strength. Also, given that professional disciplinary
actions have been viewed as having a "quasi-criminal" status,' 66 thus
implicating heightened due process concerns, it is clear why physicians
are reluctant to make the results of disciplinary proceedings available
to the public.
Nonetheless, it is the case that most information contained in
physician profiles was already available to the public before the
enactment of physician profile legislation. 67 For example, most
disciplinary actions by state medical boards are matters of public
record,' 68 as are most criminal records. The outcomes of malpractice
cases are also generally available to the public. 69 Additionally, as
pointed out above, a number of groups collect and disseminate
information about physicians, ranging from Public Citizen to the
American Medical Association. 7 ' Of course, consumers were
previously required to visit multiple sources in order to collect all of
162. Public Access to the National Practitioner Data Bank: Hearings Before the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2000) (prepared testimony of Nancy
Achin Sullivan, Executive Director, Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Medicine).
163. Public Access to the National Practitioner Data Bank: Hearings Before the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2000) (prepared testimony of Travis
B. Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America).
164. Id. (prepared testimony of Gloria Crawford Henderson, Director, Division of
Medical Quality Assurance, Florida Department of Health).
165. See Pape, supra note 129, at 992; Stewart, supra note 79, at 963.
166. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544,551 (1968).
167. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 963-64.
168. Flynn, supra note 120, at 270.
169. Id. at 271.
170. Id. at 270-71.
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the information available through physician profiles, and many of the
sources may have been difficult for average persons to access.,
However, given that most of the information contained in practitioner
profiles was already public, it is hard to see how the marginal decrease
in physician privacy caused by practitioner profiles outweighs the
increase in convenience to consumers created by collection of such
data in a single, easily accessible place.
4. Costs and Logistical Difficulties
Some opponents of physician profiles have based their opposition
on the high costs involved in collecting and maintaining the relevant
data.172 Moreover, it is argued that such costs are not justified given
that, as pointed out above,'73 the information contained in practitioner
profiles was already widely available through other sources.'
However, practitioner profiles seem to be wildly popular with
consumers. In September 2000, the Director of Florida's Division of
Medical Quality Assurance testified before Congress that Florida's
physician profile Web site had averaged more than 15,000 "hits" per
month.175 And in the first three-and-a-half years of Massachusetts'
practitioner program, 4.9 million profiles were requested.' Given
such popularity, and the number of states that have moved to
implement some sort of publicly accessible practitioner profile
program, it seems that most believe that incurring the costs necessary
to make the information contained in practitioner profiles easily and
conveniently accessible to consumers is justified.
Additionally, questions have been raised about the quality of data
contained in physician data banks.'" Obviously, the usefulness of the
information provided to consumers in physician profiles is dependent
upon the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the information
171. See supra text accompanying notes 168-170; see also Stewart, supra note 79, at
964.
172. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 989.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 168-170.
174. See Stewart, supra note 79, at 989.
175. See Public Access to the National Practitioner Data Bank: Hearings Before tie
House Commerce Con., 106th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2000) (prepared testimony of Gloria
Crawford Henderson, Director, Division of Medical Quality Assurance, Florida
Department of Health).
176. Public Access to the National Practitioner Data Bank: Hearings Before tile
House Commerce ComnL, 106th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2000) (prepared testimony of Nancy
Achin Sullivan, Executive Director, Massachusetts Board of Registration in
Medicine).
177. See, e.g., Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector
General, Managed Care Organization Nonreporting to the National Practitioner Data
Bank: A Signal for Broader Concern (2001); General Accounting Office, National
Practitioner Data Bank- Major inproventents Are Needed to Enhance Data Bank's
Reliability (2000); Pape, supra note 129, at 1018.
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provided.'78 However, there is a good deal of variability in the quality
of the data used to compile physician profiles.'79 Concerns have even
been raised about the completeness and quality of data contained in
the NPDB.8 0
It seems clear that standards regarding the quality and integrity of
data are an essential component of physician profiles.'8' In Florida,
the information contained in physician profiles is based largely upon
self-reported data from doctors seeking initial medical licenses or
extensions thereof.8 2 Therefore, it seems that the threat of under-
reporting of negative information is greater than the threat of false
positives. 18 3 And while there are penalties to be applied to doctors
who fail to report information required to be reported by the profiles
legislation,"8 there are also procedures available for doctors to correct
what they claim to be inaccurate information contained in their
profiles. 8 The NPDB has even more involved procedures for doctors
to file grievances to correct perceived inaccuracies in their records."'
C. The Prognosis for Physician Profiles
Given the fact that half the states have adopted some form of
publicly accessible physician profiles 87 and more seem likely to follow
suit, it seems clear that the responses to the above-described
arguments against publicly accessible physician profiles'88 have carried
the day, and that physician profiles are here to stay. Moreover, as
stated above, 8 9 physician profiles appear to be extremely popular with
the public. Nonetheless, it is probably too early to draw any grand
conclusions regarding the success or failure of providing public access
178. See Pape, supra note 129, at 1018.
179. Id. at 1013-14, 1018.
180. See supra text accompanying note 177.
181. See Pape, supra note 129, at 1004-08 (discussing "fair information practices"
for physician data banks).
182. Fla. Stat. ch. 456.039 (2001).
183. A fingerprint check run of all new applicants for medical licenses since 1997
and all applicants for renewals since 2000 revealed sixteen doctors who failed to
report criminal convictions as required by Florida's profile legislation. Check Reveals
Criminal Past of 2000 M.D.s, Miami Herald, June 12,2001, at 7B.
184. See Fla. Stat. ch. 456.039(3)(a), (b). Among other penalties, the state medical
board may deny a license application or revoke an existing license for failure to
provide required information, or issue fines of up to $50 for each day the required
information is not provided. Id.
185. See Fla. Stat. ch. 456.041(7). A copy of the profile must be provided to the
doctor at least thirty days before publication. The doctor then has thirty days to
correct any errors. Id
186. See Pape, supra note 129, at 1020 & nn. 294-96 (citing 45 C.F.R. 60.11(a)(2),
60.14 (1996)).
187. See supra text accompanying note 90.
188. Supra Part II.B.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 175-176.
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to state physician profiles. Indeed, it does not appear that any
comprehensive studies have been undertaken of the initiatives that
have been implemented to date. However, as pointed out above,' '
anecdotal evidence seems favorable to physician profiles.
III. IS THE TIME RIPE FOR LAWYER PROFILES
No state presently offers lawyer profiles along the lines of the
physician profiles discussed above. However, given the popularity of
physician profiles and the momentum in favor of state physician
profile legislation, it is worth asking whether the time is ripe for
lawyer profiles.
A. Underlying Conditions
While some of the conditions discussed above that led to the
adoption of physician profiles might apply equally to the legal context,
there are significant differences that suggest that the time is not yet
ripe for lawyer profiles. For example, the doctrine of informed
consent is not nearly as developed in the legal practice context as it is
in the medical context. Additionally, there is no present consensus
that there is a legal malpractice crisis. Also, peer review has not been
deemed to be as central to effective legal practice as it is to medical
practice. Finally, the National Discipline Data Bank is much less
developed than the NPDB.
1. Informed Consent
A number of commentators have argued for incorporation of the
medical concept of informed consent into the practice of law.' Yet
while attorneys have long had an ethical obligation to communicate
with their clients regarding the objectives of legal representation and
the means to be used to achieve those objectives, "2 a formal concept
of informed consent has not heretofore been a required component of
the everyday practice of lawyers in most jurisdictions. However, just
as the "doctor knows best" approach to medical practice has been
190. See supra text accompanying notes 162-163.
191. See, e.g., Susan R. Martyn, Inforned Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 307 (1980): Spiegel. supra note 98.
192. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (1998) ("A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation... and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."); R. 1.4(b)
("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.") Ethical
Consideration 7-8 of the predecessor Model Code of Professional Responsibility
stated that a lawyer "should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client
are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations." Model
Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-8 (1969).
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undermined in recent decades,1 93 so too has the belief in the certainty
and immutability of lawyers' decision making. 194 Part of the reason
for this trend lies in the consumer protection movement, as well as the
decrease in respect for authority generally in the post-Vietnam War
and Watergate eras. 95 Also, the triumph of Legal Realism has caused
a loss of faith in the autonomy of law as a discipline.'96
Additionally, the lack of incorporation of a formal concept of
informed consent in legal practice may be about to change. As part of
the ABA's Ethics 2000 project,"9 the commission charged with
reviewing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recommended
adding the concept of "informed consent"' 98 in various places
throughout the rules where consent of the client is required.'99 Should
the Commission's proposed revisions be adopted by the ABA House
of Delegates, and subsequently incorporated into various state
adaptations of the Model Rules, the result might be a strong
movement toward incorporation of the concept of informed consent
into legal practice. 200 However, none of the proposed changes would
193. See supra Part II.A.1.
194. See Cramton, supra note 23, at 607.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 607-08. The Legal Realist movement, beginning in the 1920s, challenged
the existing notion that immutable legal rules could be deduced from prior case
decisions, and then applied in future cases to yield determinate results. See Joseph
William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 467, 469 (1988) (reviewing Laura
Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986)). Rather, the Legal Realists
contended that decisions in cases are both fact specific, and functions of existing social
conditions, and therefore, are much less determinate than previously assumed. Id.
197. More formally known as the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, the project was undertaken in 1997 to conduct the first
review of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, since their promulgation
in 1983. See Margaret Colgate Love, Update on Ethics 2000 Project and Summary of
Recommendations to Date, 31 Syllabus 19 (Winter 2000). The ABA's legislative
authority, the House of Delegates, began consideration of the recommended changes
in August 2001. See James Podgers, Ethics Code Rework: New ABA Model Rules May
Be Under Construction in Next Few Months, 87 A.B.A. J. 58 (May 2001).
198. The Commission proposed adding the following definition of "informed
consent" to the Rules: "the agreement... to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct."
Model Rules of Prof'i Conduct R. 1.0 (Proposed Rule 2001),
http:/labanet.orglcpr/e2k-rulelO.html (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
199. See Chair's Introduction and Executive Summary at 3 (Aug. 2001),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-intro-summary.html (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
200. Specific instances where the proposed rules would require informed consent
of the client include: agreements between attorney and client to limit the scope or
objectives of representation, see R. 1.2(c) (Proposed Rule 2001), http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel2.html (on file with the Fordham Law Review); waivers of
confidentiality by the client, see R. 1.6(a) (Proposed Rule 2001), http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/e2k-rulel6.html (on file with the Fordham Law Review); and waivers of
concurrent conflicts of interest, see R. 1.7(b) (Proposed Rule 2001), http:/Avww.
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directly reach so far as to require a lawyer to provide information
regarding the lawyer's background, disciplinary, or malpractice
record, as part of the duty of informed consent."' This fact, along
with the lesser development of the concept of informed consent in the
legal context as compared to the medical context, suggests that the
push toward publicly accessible profiles will not yet be as strong in law
as it is in medicine.
2. Legal Malpractice
To date, lawyers have not experienced an influx of professional
liability actions of the magnitude that has effected the medical
profession.2°2 For example, an empirical study comparing doctors and
lawyers in Detroit, Michigan, and Columbus, Ohio. in the mid-1980s
showed that while 68% of the doctors in Detroit and 49% of the
doctors in Columbus had been sued for malpractice, only 20% of the
lawyers in Detroit and 18% of the lawyers in Columbus had been
similarly sued.2"3
Nonetheless, there has been a growth in malpractice litigation
against attorneys in recent years,21 and some predict that that growth
abanet.org/cprle2k-rulel7.html (on file with the Fordhanz Law Review).
201. The Commission recommended no change to Model Rule 1.1, which merely
requires that a lawyer be "competent" to undertake representation on a particular
legal matter. The Rule, in turn, defines competent representation as requiring "the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.1 (2001). Moreover, the
Comment to the Rule indicates that even if a lawvyer is not competent to undertake
the representation at the outset, the lawyer can nonetheless undertake the matter if
the lawyer can become competent through "necessary study" or "reasonable
preparation." R. 1.1 cmts. 2, 4. It is hard to see how this Rule could be interpreted
properly to require attorneys to disclose facts about their background, experience, or
disciplinary or malpractice record prior to taking on a particular case. While an
attorney's fiduciary duties to a client might require more in the way of disclosure,
such duties are not likely to arise until after the formation of an attorney-client
relationship. See, e.g., Tante v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1994). However, it is
prior to the decision whether to engage a particular attorney that the prospective
client stands to benefit most from the disclosure of such information.
202. See Gary N. Schumann & Scott B. Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal
Malpractice Litigation -Predictions, Analysis, and Proposals for Change, 30 St.
Mary's L.J. 143 (1998) (predicting tremendous future growth in number of
malpractice actions brought against attorneys). But see Manual R. Ramos, Legal
Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1657 (1994)
(arguing that the frequency of legal malpractice is much greater than acknowledged
by the profession and legal scholars), Ramos, No Lawyer or Client is Safe, supra note
63, at 1 (same); Manual R. Ramos, Legal and Latt School Malpractice: Confessions of
a Lawyer's Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 Ohio St. L. J. 863 (1996) (same)- Manual R.
Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 Tul. L Rev.
2583 (1996) (same).
203. See Peters. et al., supra note 103. at 608.
204. Rhode, supra note 68, at 165. Rhode attributes this growth to failure of
disciplinary processes to provide effective consumer remedies, consumer activism, a
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will magnify in the near future. 5 Of course, a growth in malpractice
litigation does not prove that there has in fact been an increase in
attorney malpractice. Indeed, a recent study conducted by the ABA
regarding legal malpractice claims206 found that nearly 68% of the
malpractice claims filed resulted in no payment at all to the
claimant, 207 and only a little more than 1% of the cases resulted in a
judgment for the plaintiff.2 8 Previous ABA studies resulted in similar
findings. 09 Moreover, anecdotal evidence presented to the ABA in its
study of malpractice claims in the years 1990-95 indicated that, to the
extent there was growth in the frequency and/or severity of
malpractice claims during that period, such growth was small, gradual,
and inconsistent across jurisdictions.210 No evidence presented in the
more recent study appears to contradict that trend. 1 In any event,
until there is a widespread public perception of a "crisis" in legal
malpractice, along the lines of the medical malpractice "crisis" that
was perceived in the 1980s, it seems unlikely that this factor will fuel a
significant movement toward publicly accessible lawyer profiles.
search for "deep pockets" following financial scandals, and an increase in the number
of lawyers specializing in malpractice work. Id.
205. Schumann & Herlihy, supra note 202. More particularly, Schumann and
Herlihy predict a tremendous growth in legal malpractice litigation in Texas due to 1)
a decline in the professional collegiality that made lawyers reluctant to sue other
lawyers; 2) increased difficulty in recovering from traditional defendant groups due to
changes in Texas law; 3) rising numbers of inexperienced and unmentored lawyers; 4)
a likely decline in the Texas business cycle; and 5) acceptance of novel theories of
liability including breach of fiduciary duty and liability without privity. Id. at 148-50.
206. ABA Standing Committee on Lawyer's Professional Liability, Profile of Legal
Malpractice Claims 1996-1999 (2001) [hereinafter Legal Malpractice Claims 1996-
1999]. Note that the methodology used in the ABA study involved questioning
malpractice insurers. Id. at 1. Therefore, the study does not address malpractice by
lawyers who do not carry malpractice insurance. In a similar earlier study, the ABA
estimated that between 30% and 50% of lawyers carry no malpractice insurance.
ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability, Legal Malpractice
Claims in the 1990s, at 5 (1996) [hereinafter Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s].
207. More specifically, 53.73% of the claims were abandoned without payment and
14.03% resulted in judgments for the defendant. Legal Malpractice Claims, 1996-
1999, supra note 206, at 10.
208. Id.
209. The ABA's study for the years 1990-95 found that more than 56% of the
malpractice claims filed resulted in no payment at all to the claimant, and only 0.25%
resulted in plaintiffs judgments. Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s, supra note
206, at 12. In its study of the years 1983-85, the ABA found that 68.36% of the claims
resulted in no payment to the claimant, and only 1.14% of the claims resulted in
plaintiff's judgments. Legal Malpractice Claims, 1996-1999, supra note 206, at 10.
210. Legal Malpractice Claims in the 1990s, supra note 206, at 20.




The development of peer review systems for assessing the quality of
legal services lags far behind the development of such systems in other
professions,1 2 such as medicine "13 and accounting.21'4 In his article
regarding quality assurance in medical care,2- 5 Avedis Donabedian
identifies three categories of criteria that medical professionals use to
make assessments of the quality of medical care: structure, process,
and outcome.1 6 Structural criteria identify information about the
qualifications of service providers and the place where their services
are offered.217 Process criteria focus on what is done for the client or
patient,1 8 while outcome criteria focus on results obtained.21' Because
outcomes (such as morbidity) are relatively easy to measure, initial
quality assurance techniques in the medical profession focused on
outcome measures.-2 However, over time, sophisticated structural
and process measures have been developed in the medical field.!' A
similar progression has taken place in the development of
sophisticated quality assurance measures in the accounting-, and
engineering professions.?
By contrast, the development of outcome, structure, and process
performance measures in the legal field has been ad hoc, haphazard,
and isolated. Although the Internet and other electronic databases
have made outcome data regarding legal proceedings much more
readily available, few comprehensive studies of the results of legal
representation have been conducted.24  Structure and process
measures have been implemented to a limited degree in practice
contexts involving public funding. For example, efforts to monitor the
utilization of federal funds in the federal legal services program
resulted in the publication of the ABA Standards for Providers of
Civil Legal Services to the Poor.3 Similar concerns on the criminal
212. See Susan R. Martyn, Peer Review and Quality Assurance for Lawyers. 20 U.
Tol. L. Rev. 295,295 (1989) [hereinafter Martyn, Peer Review].
213. See, e.g., Avedis Donabedian, A Primer of Quality Assurance and Monitoring
in Medical Care, 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 401 (1989).
214. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer, The Accounting Profession's Peer Review Program, 20
U. Tol. L. Rev. 375 (1989).
215. Donabedian, supra note 213.






221. Id. at 298.
222. Id. at 298-99.
223. Id. at 299.
224. Id. at 300.
225. id. at 301.
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side led to the enactment of the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice.226 Some large law firms have made some efforts to develop
systems for evaluating lawyer performance.22 7 However, such efforts
have been quite limited. Malpractice insurers have also started to get
into the business of evaluating lawyer competence in an effort to hold
the line on malpractice premiums.228
Perhaps the most concerted effort to instill a widespread peer
review component in law was undertaken by the American Law
Institute-American Bar Association ("ALI-ABA") Committee on
Continuing Professional Education, which published a Discussion
Draft of a Model Peer Review System in 1980.211 The draft included
both structural and process measures of competent legal practice.'"
Of course, the legal profession's primary code of ethics, the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, articulates a standard of
competence that all attorneys are required to maintain?'-
Additionally, the report of the ABA's McCrate Committee sets forth
specific skills that must be possessed by attorneys in order to practice
competently?132  Despite these efforts, uniform quality assurance
standards, as well as a comprehensive peer review system, have not
been implemented in the legal profession, and the above-described
efforts do not seem to have had much impact on the day-to-day
practice of law in this country.
Arguably, because the present system of lawyer disciplinary
regulation is made up of lawyers policing other lawyers, current
disciplinary systems represent a form of peer review. Moreover, to
the extent that lawyer disciplinary systems can be conceived of as a
form of peer review, they have historically suffered from some of the
same problems that have plagued the medical peer review process. In
1967, the ABA created a Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, under the direction of retired U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Thomas Clark, to review what were believed
to be serious shortcomings in then-current lawyer disciplinary systems
226. Id. at 300.
227. Id. at 301-02.
228. Id.; see also Robert E. O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law
Firms, 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 325 (1989). Robert E. O'Malley served as Loss Prevention
Counsel to the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc. Id.
229. Martyn, Peer Review, supra note 212, at 302 & n.32; see also Donald M.
Crawford, Comment, Professional Peer Review: Can the Legal Profession Learn from
the Medical Profession's Experience?, 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 473 (1989).
230. See Martyn, Peer Review, supra note 212, at 302.
231. But see supra note 201.
232. See American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar, Legal Education and Professional Development-An Educational
Continuum (Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing
the Gap) 121-221 (1992).
[Vol. 70
LAWYER PROFILES?
(the "Clark Committee").23 Indeed, the Clark Committee concluded
that the state of attorney disciplinary systems represented a
"scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of the
profession." One of the major problems identified by the Clark
Committee was a lack of adequate reciprocity between state
disciplinary authorities, such that attorneys disbarred in one
jurisdiction were being permitted to practice law after relocating to a
different jurisdiction."5 As noted above, similar criticisms were made
of the medical peer review system prior to enactment of the
HCQIA. 236
Nearly two decades after the Clark Committee issued its report, the
ABA convened another Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, this time under the direction of Robert McKay (the
"McKay Commission"). 7 The McKay Commission concluded that
many of the worst problems in disciplinary enforcement identified by
the Clark Committee had been corrected.s For example, with regard
to the Clark Committee's finding of inadequate provisions for
reciprocal discipline, the McKay Commission noted that the
subsequently drafted and widely adopted ABA Model Rules for
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contain a provision providing for a
presumption that identical discipline will be imposed in each
jurisdiction in which an attorney is licensed, based upon the
imposition of discipline in the first jurisdiction.?"9 Nonetheless, the
McKay Commission made numerous recommendations for further
improvement of attorney disciplinary systems. ' " Among these
recommendations, the McKay Commission found the lack of public
access to attorney disciplinary proceedings to be a major source of
distrust of the profession.'
Unlike the wvidespread adoption of the recommendations from the
Clark Committee's Report,2 42 the recommendations of the McKay
233. See Burnele V. Powell, Open Doors, Open Arms, and Substantially Open
Records: Consumerism Takes Hold in the Legal Profession. 28 Val. U. L Rev. 709,
722 (1994).
234. Id. at 722 (quoting American Bar Association Special Committee on
Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, Problems and Recommendations in
Disciplinary Enforcement (1970)).
235. Id.
236. See supra Part II.A.3.
237. Powell, supra note 233, at 709 & n.2.
238. American Bar Association, Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century xiv (1992) [hereinafter McKay
Commission Report].
239. Id. at 113-14 (citing ABA Model Rules for Lawy er Disciplinary Enforcement.
Rule 22 (1979)).
240. Id. at 1-86.
241. Id. at 33-34; see also DeGraw & Burton. supra note 62. at 393.
242. McKay Commission Report, supra note 238. at xiv-xv; see also Leslie C. Levin,
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Commission have not led to dramatic actual changes in attorney
disciplinary systems. Scholars still offer a variety of critiques of
attorney disciplinary enforcement systems.2 43  Most of these lie
beyond the scope of this article. However, criticisms of the lack of
public access to attorney disciplinary proceedings are relevant to the
extent that middle-income persons seeking legal representation would
find information relating to such proceedings useful in their attorney
selection process. Indeed, from the perspective of middle-income
persons seeking information that would be relevant to them in the
selection of an attorney, present attorney disciplinary systems leave
much to be desired and have improved little since the McKay
Commission wrote its report. As of 1992, in twenty-eight states,
disciplinary complaints against a lawyer did not become public until
the equivalent of a finding of probable cause was made and the matter
was referred to the state supreme court for the initiation of formal
proceedings. 2" In twenty states, disciplinary proceedings remained
confidential until sanctions were imposed. 45
Presently, in only three states will the existence of a complaint be
disclosed in the absence of a finding of probable cause.246 Oregon is
currently the only state whose lawyer disciplinary process is open to
the public at all stages of the proceedings.147 Florida and West
Virginia's disciplinary records are open to the public when a charge is
filed or a complaint is dismissed. 48  The McKay Commission
recommended that other states adopt Oregon's open system, 2 9 but to
date, no other states have completely followed suit.
Even to the extent that the results of attorney disciplinary processes
are "open" to public examination, they are rarely made available to
the public in a format that would be characterized as easily accessible
or comprehensible. For example, some jurisdictions publish the
names of disciplined attorneys without any description of the conduct
that led to the sanction, while other jurisdictions provide descriptions
of sanctionable conduct but withhold the names of the sanctioned
attorneys °0 Moreover, even jurisdictions that do provide detailed
The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998).
243. See Rhode, supra note 68, at 158-65.
244. Morton, supra note 23, at 304-05. This is the procedure that is recommended
in the ABA's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. Id. at 305 & n. I10
(citing Model Rule 16(B)).
245. Id. at 305.
246. Rhode, supra note 68, at 161.
247. Kristina Serafini Pennex, Note, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy by Opening
Michigan's Disciplinary System, 73 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 569, 579 (1996).
248. Id. at 578-79.
249. See Powell, supra note 233, at 730.
250. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 62, at 358.
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accounts of conduct resulting in discipline and identify offending
attorneys, are likely to publish this information in sources primarily
aimed at providers, not consumers, of legal services, such as bar
journals or lawyer newspapers. "  Additionally, most disciplinary
systems still provide for private reprimands and other forms of non-
public discipline.2 2 It seems quite possible that public impatience with
the secretive nature of attorney disciplinary systems might eventually
lead to a push toward lawyer profiles. However, despite the McKay
Commission's findings, it does not appear that public dissatisfaction
with lawyer disciplinary processes has yet risen to a level adequate to
spur a new round of major changes.
4. National Discipline Data Bank
The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility does maintain a
National Discipline Data Bank ("NDDB"), which is intended to be a
clearinghouse of information relating to public discipline of lawyers by
state and federal courts and federal administrative agencies. " As was
the case with the NPDB, the NDDB was intended to facilitate
interstate sharing of disciplinary information.- And, for reasons
similar to those relating to the NPDB, public access to the NDDB is
severely restricted. 5 However, unlike the NPDB, consumers can, for
a fee, receive access to current-year information regarding disciplinary
action against a lawyer from the NDDB. -- Given that the ABA is a
private rather than a governmental entity, reporting to the NDDB is
voluntary. Thus, the NDDB is seen as being a much less
comprehensive data source than the NPDB. Perhaps this fact, along
with the private status of the ABA, has prevented widespread calls for
opening up the NDDB to the public free of charge. Correspondingly,
the existence of the NDDB does not seem to have created any
momentum toward the creation of publicly accessible lawyer profiles.
B. Arguments For and Against Lawyer Profiles
In light of the above discussion, it does not appear that the time is
ripe for a movement toward lawyer profiles. Nonetheless, it is worth
reviewing the arguments that have been made for and against
physician profiles, to see if they apply similarly in the legal practice
context.
251. Id. at 355 & nn.9-10: see also Morton, supra note 23. at 307.
252. Levin. supra note 242, at 6.
253. Morton, supra note 23. at 306.
254. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.4 (discussing the NPDB).




1. Consumer Sovereignty and Autonomy
The consumer sovereignty and autonomy arguments in favor of
publicly accessible professional profiles are similar in the legal context
to those in the medical context. As consumers of legal services,
potential clients will better be able to find appropriate legal
representation the more they know about potential providers of such
services. Professor Linda Morton cites to a survey of consumers of
legal services, in which the participants indicated that the two qualities
they most sought in an attorney were integrity and quality. 7 Morton
contends that making information available to consumers regarding
disciplinary and malpractice actions against attorneys might provide
consumers with information that they value in the attorney selection
process." In the Martindale-Hubbell survey, 81% of the respondents
indicated a desire for a resource where they could look up lawyers and
their credentials.259 Three out of five (62%) indicated that they would
like access to legal resources on the Internet.2 6
Increasing information available to consumers of legal services
regarding their attorneys might also serve the autonomy interests of
such consumers. Morton argues that the more information that
consumers of legal services have regarding attorneys, the more likely
such consumers are to take an active role in the litigation of their
cases.26' Further, Morton points to evidence that increased client
participation in their legal representation leads to the delivery of
higher quality legal services.262
However, just as in the medical context, arguments have been made
that providing certain information to consumers of legal services,
particularly information relating to lawyers' malpractice and
disciplinary records, will not help consumers to make informed
decisions, but rather will mislead and confuse such consumers.2 63 As
in the medical context, perhaps the answer is to provide more
information to consumers rather than less. Disclaimer language can
be included in lawyer profiles regarding the weight that should be
given to disciplinary and malpractice information, and statistics can be
provided regarding the frequency and severity of disciplinary and
malpractice activities in the relevant jurisdiction and/or specialty
practice area.
257. Id. at 287 (citing Robert E. Smith & Tiffany S. Meyer, Attorney Advertising: A
Consumer Perspective, J. Marketing 56, 60 (Spring 1980)).
258. Id. at 288.
259. Lawyers in America, supra note 26, at 29.
260. Id. at 30.
261. Morton, supra note 23, at 290-91.
262. Id. at 291 (citing Douglas Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's In Charge?
(1974)).
263. See, e.g., Pennex, supra note 247, at 577.
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2. Impact on Legal Practice
One might also raise questions regarding the impact that lawyer
profiles might have on the practice of law. Recall that the argument
has been made that physician profiles will have a negative impact on
medical practice, and will further exacerbate the practice of
"defensive medicine."2' However, it does not appear to be the case
that the development of legal malpractice standards has had an
adverse effect on the practice of law, or has resulted in the practice of
"defensive law." 265 To the contrary, it appears that many of the
precautions taken by lawyers to avoid legal malpractice, such as
calendaring systems and conflicts checks, have had a salutary impact
on the practice of law.26 Therefore, it seems unlikely that furthering
public access to the results of malpractice actions will reverse this
trend.
The argument has been made that opening disciplinary procedures
up to public scrutiny would render such proceedings less effective, as
witnesses and complainants would not be willing to come forward, out
of fear of reprisal. 267 However, the public nature of Oregon's lawyer
disciplinary system does not appear to have had a negative impact on
the system's effectiveness.21 To the contrary, the system is generally
viewed as a great success.269
In addition, Morton contends that making public information
regarding disciplinary and malpractice actions against attorneys will
ultimately improve the poor public image of lawyers. -7t While Morton
acknowledges that the initial disclosure of the volume of complaints
against lawyers might have a negative effect on the profession's image,
she believes that in the long run such disclosure would cause lawyers
to improve their practices to avoid the embarrassment that is likely to
result from such disclosure. 7' Moreover, Morton further contends
that the public will appreciate replacement of the bar's current degree
264. See supra text accompanying note 153.
265. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
Rutgers L. Rev. 101, 139-40 (1995).
266. Id. at 140. The recent ABA report regarding legal malpractice claims shows
that claims based on administrative errors, such as missing a court date, decreased by
5% since 1995. Legal Malpractice Claims 1996-1999, supra note 206. at 11. Such
claims are presently at their lowest recorded level. Id.
267. See Pennex, supra note 247, at 576.
268. Rhode, supra note 68, at 163; McKay Commission Report, supra note 238, at
34-39; Pennex, supra note 247, at 580-81; John P. Sahl. The Public Hazard of Liwver
Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio's Struggle to Reform Its DisciplinarY System, 68
U. Cin. L. Rev. 65, 112-13 (1999).
269. See Sahl, supra note 268, at 112-13.
270. Morton, supra note 23, at 292.
271. Id. at 292-93.
2001]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of reticence to "come clean" with regard to current levels of consumer
dissatisfaction with a new approach of openness.272
3. Lawyer Privacy
The privacy arguments raised against physician profiles apply with
equal force in the legal context. Similarly however, these arguments
also seem to be outweighed by the increase in convenience to
consumers that would be provided by lawyer profiles. As was the case
with doctors, most of the information that would be contained in
lawyer profiles is already available to the public, albeit through
diverse and sometimes difficult to access sources. For example, most
state bars will provide attorney disciplinary information to inquiring
consumers.27 3 Information regarding legal malpractice judgments and
settlements is available through a variety of sources. And, of course,
most criminal records are available to the public. As argued above,
the marginal reduction in lawyer privacy that would result from
collecting such information in a single, easily accessible source is
greatly outweighed by the benefit that would be provided to
consumers from the creation of such a source. 74
4. Costs and Logistical Difficulties
The costs of creating lawyer profiles might even be greater than
those associated with the creation of physician profiles. This is
because while there were already numerous, comprehensive data
sources to draw upon in creating physician profiles, as pointed out
above,275 the existing sources of information regarding lawyers are less
thorough and comprehensive. 76 Nonetheless, given the popularity of
physician profiles, it is safe to assume that lawyer profiles would be
equally popular with the public, therefore warranting the costs that
might be involved in creating and maintaining lawyer profiles.
Similar concerns regarding data quality and database maintenance
would arise in the context of lawyer profiles as are present with regard
to physician profiles. Standards and protocols for data collection and
maintenance would be an absolute necessity. Nevertheless, many of
the lessons that are being learned with regard to data management in
the physician profile context will be applicable to lawyer profiles in
272. Id. at 292.
273. See, e.g., Morton, supra note 23, at 307-08 (discussing California Bar's
disciplinary information "hotline"); Pennex, supra note 247, at 572-73 (stating that
Michigan disciplinary proceedings are available to public after formal process has
issued).
274. See supra Part III.B.3.
275. See supra Part III.A.4.
276. See Morton, supra note 23, at 306.
[Vol. 70
LAWYER PROFILES?
the future, resulting in more comprehensive, reliable, and accurate
profiles.
C. The Prognosis for Lawyer Profiles
As pointed out above,277 because the underlying conditions that
paved the way for physician profiles do not appear to be present to
the same degree in the legal context, it seems unlikely that publicly
accessible lawyer profiles will become a reality in the near future.
Nonetheless, given the above conclusion that the arguments for
publicly accessible lawyer profiles generally outweigh those against
such profiles, 278 it is worth considering what information should or
should not be included in lawyer profiles. The following are
suggestions for categories of information that should be included and
excluded.
1. Information That Should Be Included in Lawyer Profiles
a. Demographic Information
The inclusion of basic demographic information about the
practitioner would seem to be both important to consumer decision
making and relatively unobjectionable.2 9 Information that would be
included in this category would be the name and business address of
the practitioner, colleges and law schools attended, dates of
attendance and degrees received.
b. Licensing and Certification Information
Basic license information should also be included in lawyer profiles,
such as all state bar admissions, admission dates, and bar numbers. 2"
Specialty certifications should be included in a manner consistent with
the state bar's ethics rule regarding advertising such certifications.',
Courts before which an attorney is specially admitted to practice
should also be included.
277. See supra Part III.A.
278. See supra Part III.B.
279. See, e.g., FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 5: Miller, supra note 34, at 128-29:
Pape, supra note 129, at 1022: Stewart, supra note 79, at 976-77.
280. See, e.g., FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 5-6.




Malpractice payments above mere "nuisance value" should be
included in lawyer profiles."8 While the exact figure that corresponds
to the nuisance value of a case may be difficult to determine with
certainty, and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, a fair number
to consider would be $5000.83 Disclaimer information should be
provided regarding the types of cases that generate the highest
proportion of malpractice claims, in order to provide some context for
the malpractice payment information. Similarly, language should be
included highlighting the lack of an established correlation between
malpractice payments and actual substandard practice. Moreover,
malpractice payments should be excluded from lawyer profiles after a
ten-year period, as any informational value contained in such
payments is likely to dissipate over that period of time.
The lawyer profile should include the actual amount of each
malpractice payment made above the $5000 threshold, as is currently
the practice with regard to Florida's physician profiles,& as opposed
to Massachusetts' practice of merely listing the number of payments in
its "above average," "average," or "below average" categories, 5 or
the FSMB's recommendation of simply listing the number of
malpractice judgments and settlements above threshold amounts.28 6
While providing specific numbers admittedly may add little to
consumers' information, the categorization schemes that have been
adopted seem too vague to have any informational value to
consumers at all, and seem to be too great a concession to the
opponents of providing any malpractice payment information at all.
d. Information Regarding Malpractice Insurance
Surprisingly, Oregon is the only state that actually requires lawyers
to obtain malpractice insurance.2" While an eventual move toward
mandatory malpractice insurance would seem to be warranted,2  in
the interim it seems appropriate to provide consumers with
282. See supra note 139.
283. In fact, according to the ABA's recent study, Legal Malpractice Claims 1996-
1999, supra note 206, at 13, more than 80% of the malpractice claims reported were
resolved for defense costs of $5000 or less. Additionally, the amount of indemnity
payment was $10,000 or less in 83.43% of the cases. Id. at 15.
284. See supra text accompanying note 9.
285. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
286. FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 7-8.
287. Rhode, supra note 68, at 167.




information regarding whether or not the attorney who they are
considering retaining carries malpractice insurance.
e. Disciplinary Information
Certainly, all public disciplinary information regarding an attorney
should be included in the attorney's profile. Additionally, and
perhaps most controversially, information regarding the number of all
complaints filed with disciplinary authorities against an attorney
should also be included. Of course, the argument will be made that
disclosure of complaints for which no basis was ultimately found will
unfairly harm the reputations of attorneys. '  However, there is
evidence, at least in the medical context, that complaints against
practitioners, at a minimum, demonstrate troubled relationships
between the practitioners and their clients.' This would be valuable
information for consumers to have. Moreover, only a small
percentage of dissatisfied clients actually file complaints against their
lawyers.29' Therefore, it is likely that complaint figures understate the
degree of dissatisfaction with particular attorneys. Profiles should
also include the number of listed complaints that were dismissed
without findings of probable cause.
As stated above, it does not appear that attorneys' reputations have
been unduly damaged by the availability of this type of information in
Oregon.2" Additionally, at least some complaints against attorneys
are initiated by other attorneys, judges, or other legal professionals
under the profession's self-reporting requirements. 23 While attorneys
sometimes file complaints against other attorneys for improper
purposes, such as to gain an advantage in litigation, the self-reporting
requirement also adds at least a small additional peer-review
component to the disciplinary process.29' As pointed out above, the
McKay Commission concluded that the secrecy of the present
attorney disciplinary system was a primary cause of the lack of public
confidence in that system295 and, as a result, a major factor in
dissatisfaction with the profession generally.2  Attorney profiles offer
an opportunity to provide the kind of public access to disciplinary
information that the McKay Commission called for a decade ago.'
289. See Pennex, supra note 247, at 576; Sahl, supra note 268, at 111.
290. Stewart, supra note 79, at 977.
291. See Rhode, supra note 68, at 159-60.
292. Supra text accompanying notes 268-69.
293. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.3(a) (2001).
294. See supra notes 233-52 and accompanying text.
295. See supra text accompanying note 241.
296. Id.




Information should be included in lawyer profiles regarding
criminal convictions. Although such information raises privacy
concerns of the type discussed above,298 given that criminal conviction
information is generally available to the public, and given the
likelihood that consumers would strongly desire the inclusion of such
information and might well decline to associate with lawyers
previously convicted of crimes, the benefit of including such
information outweighs the potential harms. 299
However, questions remain as to whether there should be limits on
the information provided based upon the offense involved or the age
of the conviction. For example, some would argue that only crimes
related to the practice of law should be included.""° However, lawyers
can be professionally disciplined for a broad range of criminal conduct
that calls into question the lawyer's "honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer," '' and lawyers are often denied admission to
practice based upon prior criminal activity.3" Moreover, it seems
likely that at least some consumers would find a lawyer's criminal
record to be relevant to a decision whether to retain that lawyer,
regardless of the nature of the conviction or how long ago it took
place.30 3
With regard to physician profiles, the FSMB recommends the
inclusion of all felony convictions, and any misdemeanor convictions
"involving offenses against the person, offenses of moral turpitude,
offenses involving the use of drugs or alcohol and violations of public
health and safety codes."'" The FSMB would not place any time limit
on the date of the conviction, and would require reporting of
convictions following guilty and no-contest pleas, as well as
convictions following adjudicatory proceedings."" These
recommendations seem balanced and sensible and are adopted here.
g. Optional Information
Lawyers should be given the option of including a variety of
information in their profiles. Such information should include
restrictions or limitations on the types of cases the practitioners are
298. See supra Parts II.B.3., III.B.3.
299. See, e.g., FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 6-7.
300. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 34, at 132.
301. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 8.4(b) (1998).
302. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., Regulation of Lawyers 642-43
(5th ed. 1998).
303. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 34, at 133.




willing to handle.3 6 Lawyers should also be permitted to state their
office hours and proficiency in languages other than English.
Inclusion of information such as publications authored, awards
received, committee memberships held, and community service
activities performed seems relatively innocuous but of marginal
benefit to consumers. There must be some limits on the amount of
information that can be contained in profiles, so that the profiles
remain manageable for both consumers and administrators of profiles.
Such information may also prove difficult to verify for profile
administrators.3 7 Thus, inclusion of such information should be
determined by states on a case-by-case basis.
2. Information That Should Be Excluded from Lawyer Profiles
The following categories of information should be explicitly
excluded from lawyer profiles.
a. Malpractice Claims for Which No Payment is Made
In cases where a malpractice claim is resolved without even a
"nuisance" payment to the claimant, or with a court judgment for the
defendant, a presumption should arise that the claim was without
merit. Therefore, in such instances, information relating to the claim
should not be included in lawyer profiles.' The damage to the
lawyer's reputation that would result from inclusion of information
regarding frivolous claims greatly outweighs any benefit to consumers
that might result from inclusion of such information. "
b. Criminal Charges Not Resulting in Con viction
For similar reasons why malpractice claims not resulting in payment
should be excluded, criminal charges that do not result in conviction
should be excluded from lawyer profiles."'
c. Chemical Dependency/Substance Abuse Problems
Finally, information relating to evidence of chemical dependency or
substance abuse on the part of the practitioner should also be
excluded from lawyer profiles. It is certain that consumers would like
to have reliable evidence of substance abuse by a practitioner in
306. See, e.g., R. 7.4 (1998).
307. See FSMB Report, supra note 91, at 10.
308. See, eg., Miller, supra note 34, at 134 (discussing issue in medical context);
Stewart, supra note 79, at 988 (same).




determining whether to retain that lawyer. However, there is reason
to believe that disclosure of this type deters substance abusers from
seeking the help they need to address their addictions. 3 ' Ultimately,
consumers will benefit more from substance abusers getting the help
they need, than they will from disclosure of past evidence of abuse.
To the extent that previous substance abuse actually had a significant
effect on the lawyer's practice, it is likely that the abuse will be
reflected in disciplinary information or criminal convictions that will
be included in lawyer profiles. Moreover, in the absence of such
concrete effects, it is likely that information relating to substance
abuse will be difficult to substantiate and subject to dispute.
Therefore, isolated evidence of chemical dependency or substance
abuse should not be included in lawyer profiles.
CONCLUSION
When we left the story of our search for a pediatrician, my wife and
I were about to conduct interviews with each of the three prospective
candidates. Pediatrician A was eliminated from our consideration
relatively quickly, because his hospital admitting privileges were at a
facility that was too far from our home to be practical. Our interview
with Physician C went very well. My wife and I found Physician C to
be personable, extremely energetic, enthusiastic, and similar to us in
age and outlook. Moreover, Physician C had recently become a
mother herself, so it seemed that her knowledge of the issues that we
would face would likely be of a more recent, intimate, and personal
kind than would be the case with regard to the other candidates.
These facts, combined with the favorable references described above,
made Physician C seem like the best choice.
On the other hand, Physician B, a more experienced practitioner,
seemed a bit tired and jaded in our interview. Of course, this could
have been due to any number of non-recurrent and unknown (at least
to us) factors, not the least of which may have been that our interview
took place at the end of what might have been a long day.
Nonetheless, the less than scintillating interview, combined with the
troubling malpractice and disciplinary information contained in
Physician B's profile, 2 caused us to place Physician B second in our
initial ranking.
However, another series of developments occurred between our
initial ranking of physicians and our daughter's birth, and our
311. Accord Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 3-7.1(o) (stating that the reason for the
inadmissibility in disciplinary proceedings of evidence that the attorney has sought
drug or alcohol treatment is to encourage attorneys to seek such treatment without
fear of negative consequences).
312. See supra Introduction.
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subsequent final decision regarding her pediatrician. One of my wife's
colleagues, who was due to deliver around the same time as my wife,
gave birth to a son six weeks prematurely. As a result, the boy had a
number of serious, though not life-threatening, health problems. My
wife's colleague had selected Physician C to be her son's pediatrician.
However, after a few visits, my wife's colleague was particularly
unhappy with the service that she and her son had received from
Physician C's office. Moreover, Physician C's office seemed ill-
equipped to handle the special medical needs of the prematurely born
boy. In fact, Physician C's office eventually referred my wife's
colleague and her son to Physician B, on grounds that his office would
be better able to handle the boy's special medical needs.
Not surprisingly, this development led to a change of course for my
wife and me. While we were hopeful that our child would be born
without special medical needs, we wanted a pediatrician who was well
equipped to deal with such an unfortunate development should it
transpire. Therefore, despite a less than stellar practitioner profile
and a less than scintillating interview, my wife and I changed our
chosen pediatrician back to Physician B.
Fast forward nearly a year. My wife and I have been extremely
pleased with the service that we have received from Physician B and
his office (and my wife's colleague's son is doing very well, too). So
what does this tell us about physician, and perhaps even lawyer
profiles? Of course, it's hard to say, and it would be foolish to draw
grand conclusions from a single anecdote. Given that I am a lawyer
who has had some professional experience with both legal and
medical malpractice cases, opponents of profiles might attribute to my
wife and me an above-average knowledge of the frequency of medical
malpractice and disciplinary actions and of the relatively low
predictive value that can be placed upon three undescribed blemishes
on an apparently otherwise spotless practice record. Thus, they might
go on, we were much more willing and better able to discount the
negative information contained in Physician B's practitioner profile
than the average consumer would be.
However, we did place significant weight on Physician B's
disciplinary and malpractice record. Yet in the end, that record
turned out to be just one part of what was a relatively complex, multi-
factored analysis. I believe that most consumers would treat this
information in a similar manner, as one factor to consider, rather than
being absolutely determinative. On balance, we were very glad to
have Physician B's practitioner profile at our disposal, and I believe
that most non-lawyers would feel the same way, even if their analyses
of the information might be somewhat different from ours.
Moreover, I know that if lawyer profiles were available, and I were
looking to hire a lawyer, I'd check them out as well. And I can't
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imagine why a non-lawyer looking to hire a lawyer would feel any
differently. Therefore, even if the time for lawyer profiles isn't this
moment, that time should be coming relatively soon.
